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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  reviews r e c e n t  exper iments  i n  t h e  f i e l d  of jury  
decision-making.  The exper iments  are d i s c u s s e d  and eva lua t ed  i n  
t e r m s  of t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e i r  s i m u l a t i o n  and t h e i r  conceptua l iza -  
t i o n  of  t h e  r e s e a r c h  problem. A review o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  most of  t h e  r e c e n t  exper imenta l  work has  been flawed t o  such 
an e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  should n o t  be  g e n e r a l i z e d  t o  t h e  ju ry  
system. 
We r e p o r t  t h e  r e s u l t s  of a  ju ry  exper iment  which avoids  many 
o f  t h e  prev ious  e x t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  problems. W e  show t h a t  q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  conc lus ions  can be drawn about  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  of  t h e  
j u ry  system-when t h e  s imu la t ion  t echn ique  and concep tua l i za t ion  
a r e  improved. _ 
We a l s o  r e p o r t  a r e p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  experiment u s ing  nondel ibera-  
t i n g  s t u d e n t s  a s  s u b j e c t s .  By comparing t h e s e  r e s u l t s  w i th  t h e  
r e s u l t s  ob t a ined  when a c t u a l  j u r o r s  a r e  used as s u b j e c t s  and al lowed 
t o  d e l i b e r a t e ,  w e  can more a c c u r a t e l y  a s s e s s  t h e  consequences of  
d i f f e r en t~me thodo log i ca l  approaches.  S e v e r a l  hypotheses a r e  proposed 
t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  inexper ienced  s u b j e c t s  and n o n d e l i b e r a t i n g  
j u r o r s  on exper imenta l  r e s u l t s .  
INTRODUCTION 
I n  the l a s t  decade o r  so numerous.socia1 psychologis t s  have 
s t u d i e d  jury behavior by s imula t ing  t r i a l s .  i n . . t h e  ' laboratory.  
Many of t h e s e  s t u d i e s  have had a  dua l  purpose. On t h e  one hand 
they w e r e  designed t o  test hypotheses developed i n  s o c i a l  psychology 
about how ind iv idua l s  and groups make dec i s ions  and t h e  way i n  
which they use information t o  make t h e s e  dec i s ions .  On. the o t h e r  
hand, t h e  s t u d i e s  have hoped t o  t e l l  u s  something about how j u r i e s  
i n  r e a l  t r i a l s  make dec i s ions .  
This p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of jury s t u d i e s  l o g i c a l l y  fol lows from t h e  
development of t h e  sub- f i e ld  commonly known a s  a t t r i b u t i o n  theory.  
Ever s i n c e  Heider ' s  e a r l y  work (Heider: 1958) and Ke l ly ' s  important 
t h e o r e t i c a l  con t r ibu t ions  (Kelly: 1967) a  main branch of a t t r i b u -  
t i o n  theory has concerned i t s e l f  wi th  causa l  a t t r i b u t i o n s .  These 
a r e  very c l o s e l y  t i e d  t o  t h e  a t t r i b u t i o n s  which j u r i e s  make i n  
c r imina l  and c i v i l  t r ia ls .  One of t h e  primary t a s k s  of t h e  jury 
i s  t o  a t t r i b u t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  one p a r t y  o r  t h e  o the r .  A 
s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of t h e  a t t r i b u t i o n  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  t h e  
dec i s ion  a s  t o  whether t h e  defendant "caused" an untoward event  
i n  some l e g a l l y  r e l e v a n t  fashion.  Thus t h e  study of jury dec is ion  
making is  a  n a t u r a l  p lace  t o  examine a t t r i b u t i o n  processes .  
Given t h e  dua l  purpose of much of t h e  r e sea rch ,  however, com- 
promises have been made which we b e l i e v e  have s e r i o u s l y  l i m i t e d  
t h e  g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y  of t h e  r e sea rch  t o  t h e  way i n  which r e a l  
j u r i e s  decide r e a l  cases  i n  r e a l  c o u r t s .  These compromises have 
been made i n  terms of t h e  adequacy of t h e  s imula t ion  and t h e  
conceptualization of decision making within the context of a legal 
system. 
In this paper we will review recent expefiments and report 
the results of an experiment which attempts to correct some of the 
simulation problems and clarify the conceptual issues. We will 
compare these findings with previous work and with results obtained 
in a replication of the present experiment using the more typical 
methodology. We hope to show that typical simulation methods.do 
indeed greatly distort,the laboratory findings, and that a clearer 
conception of how real juries decide may only be obtakned through 
more realistic simulation!:", and refined conceptualization. 
'i 
REVIEW OF RECENT EXPERIMENTS 
The fol1owing.i~ a li,st of some recent articles which discuss 
I decision making within the context of a jury decision. 
Landy & Aronson, 1969; Efran, 1974; Sigall & Ostrove, 1975; 
Kaplan & Kemrnerick,.l974; ~emeth & Sosis, 1973;' Mitchell & Byrne, 
1972 and 1973;'.Stephan, 1974; Sue, Smith & Caldwell, 1973;' Griffitt 
& Jackson, 1973; Izzett & Leginski, 1974; McComas & Noll, 1974. 
While it is impossible to summarize these articles in a few 
words, the general thrust of the work is that it has followed the 
legal realist line of looking for ways in which the law in action 
deviates from the law on the books. In 1930 the noted.:legal 
scholar Leon Green commented that there was a "great difference 
between law.in statement and law in operation; between jural 
postulates and jury judgements,' (1930:178). Dean Green drew this 
conclusion from personal observation, with no systematic data to 
back up his argument. The social psychologists working in the 
l a b o r a t o r y  have been about  t h e  bus iness  of  proving the t r u t h  of 
Green ' s  s ta tement .  
The experiments .have examined t h e  e f f e c t  of such v a r i a b l e s  
a s  v i c t i m  and defendant  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  (Landy & Aronson, 1969; 
Ef ran ,  1974; I z z e t t  & ~ e g i n s k i ,  1974; S i g a l l  & 'Ostrove; 1975) ,  
defendant  c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s  (Kaplan & Kemmerick, .1974; Nemeth & 
S o s i s  , 1;9;7;3 - -  - I), j u ry  a t t i t u d e s  and p e r s o n a l i t y  ( G r i f f i t t  & Jackson, - ., 
1973; M i t c h e l l  & Byrne, 1973) .  and sex  o f ,  defendant  and ju ro r  (Stephan, 
1974) . Most o f  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  - a r e  a rguably .  e i t h e r  i r r e l e v a n t  o r  
margina l ly  r e l e v e n t  i n  t h e  law. Thus. i f  a ju ry  dec ides  a case  
accord ing  t o  the s t r ic t  l e g a l  c r i t e r i a  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  should n o t  
produce va r i ance  i n  jury  v e r d i c t s .  
The r e s u l t s  of most of t h e  exper imenta l  work a r e  t h a t  i n  f a c t  
such f a c t o r s  d o  produce var iance  i n  t h e  dependant v a r i a b l e .  The 
conclus ion  one might draw is  t h a t  t h e r e  is  a s i g n i f i c a n t  use of 
l e g a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  c r i t e r i a  i n  t h e  jury  decision-making process .  
TO' t h e i r  c r e d i t  none of t h e  a u t h o r s . o f  t h e s e  experiments b a l d l y  
a s s e r t  t h a t .  r e a l  j u r i e s  a r e  i r r a t i o n a l  i n .  t h i s .  fash ion .  They q u a l i f y  
and moderate t h e i r  conclusions by r ecogn iz ing  t h a t  t h e . l a b o r a t o r y  i s  
n o t  a r e a l  courtroom. They note  t h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t s  knew t h a t  no 
one ' s  l i f e ,  money o r  freedom was r e a l l y  a t  s t a k e .  Never the less ,  
t h e  s t u d i e s  do imply t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  have some re levance  t o  t h e  
courtroom. 
Thus, Landy and Aronson a r e  "encouraged by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  
t h e  absence of extraneous s t i m u l i ,  our  r e s u l t s  p a r a l l e l e d  some of 
t h e  f i n d i n g s  of Kalven and Ze i se l  (1966) i n  t h e i r  examination of 
a c t u a l  cases"  (1969: 151-152). M i t c h e l l  and Byrne f i n d :  "some 
comfort about  t h e  comparabi l i ty  of  t h e  l a b o r a t o r y  and t h e  ' r e a l  world '  
[because o f ]  t h e  correspondence between exper imenta l  f i n d i n g s  and 
t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n a l  and d e s c r i p t i v e  d a t a  ga the red  i n  l e g a l  s e t t i n g s "  
(1973:128). E f r an  concludes  t h a t ,  " n e i t h e r  l e g a l i s t i c  ana lyses ,  
s t a t e m e n t s  based on f a i t h ,  o r  even j u r o r s '  own p o s t - t r i a l  r e f l e c t i o n s  
a c c u r a t e l y  p o r t r a y  t h e  importance of  seemingly i r r e l e v a n t  i n f l u e n c e s  
on t h e  j u d i c i a l  p roces s"  (1974: 5 2 ) .  Kaplan and Kernmerick even 
imply t h a t  t h e  exper imenta l  s e t t i n g  may produce less dramat ic  
r e s u l t s  t h a n  would t h e  real  t h i n g .  "To underscore  t h e  b i a s i n g  power 
of de fendan t  a t t r i b u t e s ,  n o t e  t h a t  t h i s  exper iment  employed t r a i t  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  a s  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s ;  c o n s i d e r  t h e  magnitude o f - s u c h  
e f f e c t s  i n  r e a l - l i f e  s e t t i n g s  where de fendan t  behavior  i s  i n  t h e  
f l e s h "  (1974: 498) .  
I t  seems t h a t  most o f  t h e  exper imenters  would ag ree  wi th  G r i f f i t t  
and Jackson t h a t  what t hey  a r e  examining i s  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  gene ra l  
p roces ses  o f  e v a l u a t i v e  behavior  t h a t  shou ld  a f f e c t  i real ju ry  
behavior  (1973: 7 ) ;  and f u r t h e r  ag ree  w i t h  S i g a l l  and Ostrove t h a t  
" s imu la t ions  c o n s t i t u t e  l e g i t i m a t e  avenues f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  person 
. 
pe rcep t ion  and interpersonal , - judgement ,  and t h e r e  i s  no obvious 
-- 
reason  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e s e  p roces ses  would n o t  have t h e  e f f e c t s  
i n  t r i a l  proceedings  t h a t  t hey  do e lsewhere"  (1975: 413) . 
We do n o t  wish t o  a rgue  w i t h  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  l a b o r a t o r y  
s imu la t ions  c o n s t i t u t e  l e g i t i m a t e  avenues of  r e sea rch .  S ince  t h e  
Chicago J u r y  s tudy  caused t h e  United S t a t e s  Congress t o  pas s  
l e g i s l a t i o n  making it a  crime t o  w i r e t a p  juryrooms, even wi th  t h e  
consen t  of  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  t h e i r  a t t o r n e y s  and t h e  judge, people  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  j u ry  r e s e a r c h  have been compelled t o  use  a l t e r n a t e  
methods. The l a b o r a t o r y  s imu la t ion  i s  probably t h e  b e s t  s u b s t i t u t e ,  
but  it is c l e a r  t h a t  this s e t t i n g  l eaves  much t o  b e - d e s i r e d .  Most 
obviously,  t h e  s u b j e c t s  know . t h a t  no onel's f a t e . ' r e s t s  i n  t h e i r  
hands. Nevertheless ,  s imula t ions  can be more o r  l e s s  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h e  r e a l  th ing .  What w e  wish t o  argue i s  t h a t  t h e  s imula t ions  under 
cons ide ra t ion  a r e  s o  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  " r e a l  th ing"  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
i n  f a c t  very good reason t o  doubt t h a t  t h e  processes  would opera te  
t h e  same way i n  r e a l  t r i a l  proceedings. This  has been due, pr imar i ly  
t o  four  f a c t o r s :  a )  t h e  instrument  used, b)  t h e  na tu re  and obtrusive-  
ness  of t h e  independent v a r i a b l e ,  c )  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  dependent 
v a r i a b l e ,  and d )  t h e  presence of j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
1) Instrument Problems 
I n  a l l  bu t  one experiment t h e  s t i m u l i  were presented by having 
t h e  s u b j e c t s  read a  s h o r t  s c r i p t  s e t t i n g  o u t  t h e  f a c t s .  Usually t h e  
s c r i p t  was a  few paragraphs desc r ib ing  t h e  f a c t s  of t h e  case which 
va r i ed  only i n  t h e  i n s e r t i o n  of appropr ia t e  paragraphs, 'describing 
t h e  defendant ' s  a t t i t u d e s ,  sex o r  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s .  I n  some a t t r a c t i v e -  
ness  manipulations a  photograph purpor t ing  t o  be a  p i c t u r e  of  t h e  
defendant was included.  I n  two s t u d i e s ,  (Vidmar and McComas & Noll)  
although a  w r i t t e n  instrument  was used, t h e  evidence was presented . - 
i n  t h e  form of t h e  testimony of  t h e  p a r t i e s  and o t h e r  witnesses .  
Only i n  t h e  G r i f f i t t  and Jackson study was another  method used. I n  
t h a t  s tudy t h e  s u b j e c t s  were shown a  videotape.  The t ape ,  however, 
was t h a t  of an i n d i v i d u a l  reading a  s c r i p t .  From o t h e r  s t u d i e s  
(e.g. M i l l e r  e t .  a l l  1974:3) we have s t r o n g  reason t o  suspec t  t h a t  
t h e  method of having s u b j e c t s  read a  s h o r t  v i g n e t t e  i s  a  f a r  d i f -  
f e r e n t  s t i m u l i  from t h e  a c t u a l  courtroom proceeding. These same 
s t u d i e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a  videotape reproduct ion i s  a  f a r  super io r  
s imulat ion.  
2 )  Independent Var iable  Problems 
The most s e r i o u s  consequence of us ing  .scripts which p resen t  
only a  bareboned f a c t  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t o  d ramat ica l ly  heighten t h e  
importance of the independent v a r i a b l e  s i n c e  t h e  manipulation 
c o n s t i t u t e s  a  d i sp ropor t iona te  sha re  of t h e  t o t a l  s t imulus.  For 
-, 
example, i n  t h e  second Landy &ti- :&rp_n-SsQr! ,e,%~~r&men$ t:C-bbe~ se_PQrkr..two 
- 
experiments i n  t h e i r  1269 a r t i c l e )  approximately four  inches of type 
i s  devoted t o  background information,  ( i .e .  t h e  f a c t s  of t h e  c a s e ) .  
The manipulation i s  two inches song and it i s  t h e  l a s t  t h i n g  t h a t  
t h e  s u b j e c t s  r e a d .  One-third of t h e  e n t i r e  s t imulus  i s  devoted t o  
t h e  manipulation. I n  t h e  1973 Mitchel l  & Byrne study t h e  manipulation 
i s  approximately t h r e e  inches long and t h e  remaining information i s  
about 7 l / 2 .  inches.  In  t h e  Nemeth and S o s i s  a r t i c l e  t h e  r a t i o  i s  
approximately.1 1 / 2  inches of manipulation t o  4 1 / 4  inches of o t h e r  
information.  For seve ra l3 .a r t i c l e s  it i s  impossible  t o  r econs t ruc t  
even t h i s  crude es t ima te  of t h e  sa l i encesof  t h e  manipulation, but  
one can hazard t h e  guess t h a t  it usua l ly  v a r i e s  between one-third 
and one f i f t h  of t h e  e n t i r e  s t imulus.  An except ion a r e  some s t u d i e s  
where t h e  manipulation i s  a  photograph (Efran;  S i g a l l  & Ostrove) .  
Clear ly  one cannot make easy in fe rences  about  t h e  importance of 
p i c t u r e s  versus  words, b u t  i f  t h e  o l d  Chinese saying i s  c o r r e c t  
t h i s  makes. the manipulation the  most important  s t imulus  i n  t h e  
experiment. There a r e  some s t u d i e s  where t h e  manipulation i s  not  
s o  overwhelming bu t  i n  most cases  t h e  manipulation is f a r  more 
s a l i e n t  than any one p iece  of evidence would be i n  a  r e a l  t r i a l .  2 
In  add i t ion  t o  making t h e  manipulation very s a l i e n t  t h e  
experiments f r equen t ly  maximize t h e  va r i ance  on t h e  va r i ab le .  
Maximizing t h e  va r i ance  on t h e  independent v a r i a b l e  is. n o t  an un- 
reasonable procedure f o r  s o c i a l  psychologis t s .  I t . d o e s ,  however, 
lead  t o  a depar tu re  from t h e  r e a l i t y  of  many, . i f  n o t  most t r i a l s .  
Through t h e  process  of cross-examination .and opening and c los ing  
arguments t h e  a k t o r n e ~ s  o f t e n  at tempt  t o  reduce var iance  on some of 
t h e  t h i n g s  t h e  experiments maximize. Few wi tnesses  appear a s  bad 
o r  good a s  the p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  experiments a f t e r  both counsel have 
had a chance t o  ques t ion  them. 
Moreover, t h e  r u l e s  of evidence would make it d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
some of t h e  evidence t o  l5e admitted a t  a l l .  In  t h e  Landy and Aronson 
case  f o r  example, much of  t h e  evidence concerning t h e  u n a t t r a c t i v e  
defendant and v ic t im i s  c l e a r l y  and b l a t a n t l y  inadmissible .  I n  no 
American j u r i s d i c t i o n  could t h e  jury be t o l d  t h a t  t h e  v ic t im i n  
an automobile neg l igen t  homocide case  was a notor ious  gangster  who 
a l l eged ly  was re spons ib le  f o r  t h e  massacre of f i v e  men, o r  t h a t  he 
had been i n d i c t e d  f o r  mail  f raud and income t a x  evasion,  o r  even 
t h a t  he was ca r ry ing  a . 3 2  c a l i b e r  p i s t o l  a t  t h e  time of t h e  acc ident .  
Nor could they be t o l d  over  t h e  d e f e n s e ' s  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  defen- 
dant  was a two-time divorcee.  Several  o t h e r  s t u d i e s  have, l i k e  
Landy and Aronson, run roughshod over t h e  r u l e s  of evidence.  
Most impor tant ly ,  a l l  but  two of t h e  s t u d i e s  manipulated only 
an " i r r e l e v a n t "  f a c t o r .  I n  doing so they have committed a c e t e r i s  
par ibus  f a l l a c y .  The c r u c i a l  i s s u e  f o r  jury d e l i b e r a t i o n s  is  whether 
" i r r e l e v a n t "  f a c t o r s  overwhelm r e l e v e n t  i s s u e s  s o  a s  t o  make jury 
-. 
dec i s ion  making i r r a t i o n a l .  This i s  a very s e r i o u s  ques t ion ,  bu t  
it i s  n o t  - t h e  ques t ion  addressed by most o f  t h e  s t u d i e s .  By f a i l i n g  
t o  manipulate anything b u t  " i r r e l e v a n t "  f a c t o r s  these  s t u d i e s  a r e  
asking a  d i f f e r e n t  ques t ion ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  nothing else about a  case 
v a r i e s  w i l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  base t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  upon " i r r e l e v a n t "  c r i t e r i a ?  
Regardless of t h e  answer t o  t h i s  ques t ion ,  it cannot address  t h e  
f i r s t  and c e n t r a l  i s s u e  concerning jury d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  
The r e s u l t s  of  t h e  two s t u d i e s  which avoid t h i s  c e n t r a l  problem 
are reveal ing . .  I n  t h e  Sue, Smith and Caldwell s tudy t h e  evidence 
of g u i l t  was manipulated (weak o r  s t r o n g  evidence a g a i n s t  t h e  
defendant ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  study manipulated judic i .a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
a s  t o  t h e  a d m i s s i b i l i t y  of some wi re tap  evidence.  The evidence 
der ived  from t h e  wi re tap  was c l e a r l y  p roba t ive  a s  t o  t h e  defendant ' s  
g u i l t ,  bu t  might have been inadmissible  on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
The s t r e n g t h  of evidence manipulation had a s ign i . f i can t  impact 
2 upon t h e  v e r d i c t s  ( X  =13.86 d f = l  p  = .005) .  The j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n  
manipulation apparent ly  had no s i g n i f i c a n t - i m p a c t  on jury v e r d i c t s  
i n  t h e  weak evidence condi.d2ion, b u t  d i d  in f luence  v e r d i c t s  i n  the  
- 3  3 s t r o n g  evidence condi t ion  - ( I 9 7  3 i350'351)~~- 1 
i. 
I n  t h e  Kaplan & Kemmerick study both  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  
defendant and t h e  l e v e l  of incr iminat ion  of  t h e  evidence were 
manipulated. While t h e  authors  do n o t  r e p o r t  t h e  d a t a  i n  such a  
, % 
way t h a t  we can comp,are t h e  proport ion of var iance  on g u i l t  o r  
sentence  explained by t h e s e  two f a c t o r s ,  an examination of the  F 
r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  manipulation was- by f a r  t h e  more 
s i g n i f i c a n t .  4 
Thus i n  t h e  two cases  where r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r s  were manipulated 
they s i g n i f i c a n t l y  inf luenced t h e  jury v e r d i c t ,  and i n  one study 
ove.rwfi 'e . fL~e~ t h e  e f f e c t  of i r r e l e v a n t  evidence.  
3 )  The Dependent V a r i a b l e  Problem -
~ a n d y  & Aronson's  e a r l y  (1969) j u ry  s i m u l a t i o n  has  been q u i t e  
impor t an t  i n  t h e  j u ry  decision-making l i t e r a t u r e .  I t  was t h e  f i r s t  
a r t ic le  of r e c e n t  v i n t a g e  t o  examine t h e  i s s u e  of a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  
w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  j u ry  s e t t i n g s .  A s  a consequence of i t s  
primacy i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  t h e  g e n e r a l  f a c t s  o f  t h e  c a s e  have been 
used by subsequent  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  i n  t h e i r  own r e sea rch .  The Landy 
& Aronson c a s e ,  ( h e r e i n a f t e r  c a l l e d  t h e  Sander c a s e  a f t e r  t h e  
name of t h e  defendant )  w a s  used by G r f f f i t t  & Jackson,  I z z e t t  & 
Leg insk i ,  M i t c h e l l  & Byrne and Nemeth & S o s i s .  The reasons  f o r  t h e  
widespread u s e  of t h i s  case are unders tandable .  The c a s e  has  
produced s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  p a s t  and t h e r e  i s  something t o  
be  s a i d  f o r  r e p l i c a t i o n .  Neve r the l e s s ,  t h e  choice  of t h i s  ca se  i s  
extremely u n f o r t u n a t e  s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  o r  no doubt b u t  t h a t  .- . 
t h e  defendant  is  legal ly r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  crime wi th  which he i s  
charged.  The i s s u e  t h a t  t h e  " j u r o r s "  a r e  asked t o  d e c i d e c i s  how 
s e v e r e l y  t h e  defendant  should  be  punished,  and n o t  whether he i s  
g u i l t y  o f  t h e  crime charged.  
Even i n  some of  t h e  exper iments  where t h e  Sander c a s e  was n o t  
used t h e  same problem emerges. Thus i n  t h e  S i g a l l  & Ostrove expe r i -  
ment t h e  j u r o r s  were on ly  asked t o  d e c i d e  t h e  sen tence .  I n  
M i t c h e l l  & Byrne and i n  t h e  Stephan exper iment  t h e  c a s e s  w e r e  
s t r o n g l y  b i a s e d  toward g u i l t y . 5  Thus i n  8 o f  t h e  11 s t u d i e s  t h e  . 
primary dependent v a r i a b l e  w a s  s e n t e n c e ,  n o t  g u i l t ,  and i n  4 of 
t h e  s t u d i e s  t h e  g u i l t  i s s u e  was n o t  even r a i s e d .  
Moreover, even i n  t h e  s t u d i e s  where t h e r e  was an i s s u e  of  
g u i l t ,  t h i s  w a s  confounded by a sk ing  t h e  j u r o r s  t o  a l s o  s en t ence  
t h e  defendant .  The s t a n d a r d  form of t h i s  d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  was t o  
give  t h e  juror  a s h o r t  ques t ionna i re  which asked whether t h e  defendant 
was g u i l t y ,  and d i r e c t l y  below asked what sentence t h e  defendant 
should rece ive .  The s u b j e c t s  could,  and presumably some dkd, 
look ahead t o  t h e  next  ques t ion  and thereby e n t e r t a i n  t h e  i s s u e  of 
appropr ia t e  sentence  while  a r r i v i n g  a t  a  dec i s ion  a s  t o  t h e  defendant ' s  
g u i l t . 6  Only i n  t h e  Kaplan & Kemmerick s tudy were t h e s e  two i s s u e s  
apparent ly kept  completely s e p a r a t e  f o r  t h e  s u b j e c t s .  
In  s u b s t i t u t i n g  sentence  f o r  g u i l t  o r  confounding t h e  two i s s u e s  
f o r  t h e  ju ro r s  t h e  experiments have committed a  groundwater mistake. 
Nei ther  i n  law nor  i n  common sense  a r e  t h e s e  synonomous i s s u e s ,  and 
except  i n  t h e  narrow circumstance of t h e  death penal ty  r e a l  ju ro r s  
a r e  never permit ted t o  even recommend a sentence.  They a r e  i n  f a c t  
o f t e n  admonished t h a t  t h i s  is  n o t  t h e i r  bus iness .  Thei r  bus iness  i s  
t o  decide whether t h e  defendant i s  g u i l t y  of t h e  crime charged; no 
more, no l e s s .  
This i s s u e ,  however, even goes beyond t h e  ques t ion  of e x t e r n a l  
v a l i d i t y  t o  a c t u a l  j u r i e s .  I t  s e r i o u s l y  compromises t h e  f indings  
of t h e  experiments s i n c e  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c r i t e r i a  f o r  determining 
sentences given an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  g u i l t  a r e  much broader than t h e  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  determining g u i l t .  Among r e l e v a n t  i s s u e s  a r e  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  would engage i n  t h e  a c t i v i t y  i n  
t h e  f u t u r e ,  whether t h e  commission and consequences of t h e  a c t  
were punishment i n  themselves and whether t h e  defendant i s  t h e  
type of person t h a t  should be e x i l e d  from t h e  community f o r  a  
per iod  of time. .This i s  n o t  meant t o  agrue t h a t  defendant 
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  per -. se, , a s  from a photograph, i s  an appropr ia te  
c r i t e r i a  upon which t o  sentence someone t o  j a i l .  Clear ly  it 
should n o t - b e ,  and one should n o t  draw i n f e r e n c e s  from phys i ca l  
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  t o  make judgements,on t h e  t y p e s  o f  i s s u e s  mentioned 
above. I t  could  be  argued wi th  on ly  s l i g h t l y  less conv ic t ion  t h a t  
a p e r s o n ' s  s o c i a l  s t a t u s  should n o t  p l ay  a r o l e .  Thus whether 
John Sander i s  a  w e l l  l i k e d  in su rance  a d j u s t o r  o r  a  l i t t l e  l i k e d  
j a n i t o r  should make no d i f f e r e n c e .  The f a c t  t h a t  it does ,  however, 
must be i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  l i g h t  of o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  F i r s t  of 
a l l ,  it i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e s e  j u r o r s  c o n s i d e r  t h i s  t ype  of g r o s s  
s t a t u s  d i s t i n c t i o n  o r  p h y s i c a l  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  d i s t i n c t i o n  a s  " b e s t  
evidence"  a s  t o  t h e  need f o r  d e t e r r e n c e  o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f u t u r e  
i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t y .  Most people  would l i k e  b e t t e r  evidence,  b u t  
g iven t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  a  d e c i s i o n ,  it i s  n o t  unreasonable  t h a t  
i n f e r e n c e s  are made from t h e s e  f a c t o r s .  When t h e  on ly  in format ion  
i s  t a n g e n t i a l l y  p r o b a t i v e  it may be r e l i e d  upon. This  does  n o t  
prove t h a t  i f  more p r o b a t i v e  evidence w e r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  (e .g .  d e f e n d a n t ' s  
remorse, p a s t  d r i v i n g  r eco rd )  t h a t  it would n o t  overwhelm t h e  
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  d a t a .  The answer t o  t h e  l a t t e r  q u e s t i o n  i s  s t i l l  
open. 
Second, w e  should  cons ider  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  I z z e t t  and Leginsk i  
s tudy  d i s c u s s e d  below (p.  1 4 ) .  A f t e r  group d i s c u s s i o n  t h e  s en t ences  
f o r  a t t r a c t i v e  and u n a t t r a c t i v e  de fendan t s  d i d  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r .  One of  t h e  consequences of group d e l i b e r a t i o n  may be t o  
he igh ten  t h e  awareness of j u r o r s  t h a t  such f a c t o r s  should n o t  be 
r e l i e d  upon i n  s e t t i n g  sen tences .  
And f i n a l l y  w e  must r e c a l l  t h a t  i n  a l l  b u t  one experiment t h e  
two i s s u e s  of  g u i l t  and sen tence  were probably  cons idered  s imul ta -  
neously  by many of  t h e  s u b j e c t s .  Thus it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n f e r  
whether a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  would have assumed t h e  same importance i f  
g u i l t  were completely separa ted  from sentence. '  Where both g u i l t  
and sentence  were a t  i s s u e  it appears t h a t  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  played 
I 
less of a ro leVon  v e r d i c t  outcomes than on sentence 'outcomes 
(e.g.  Efran,  .1974:49). 7 
The f i n a l  d i f f i c u l t y  with t h e  des ign  of t h e  experiments i s  t h e  
genera l  absence of any j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  a s  t o  how ju ro r s  should 
decide t h e  case .  I n  t h e  McComas and No11 and Vidrnar experiments 
p a r t  of  t h e  j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  t h e  crimes f o r  which t h e  defendant 
could be found g u i l t y ,  was i n  f a c t  t h e  manipulation. Only four  of - 
t h e  remaining 11 experiments had any j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  a t  a l l .  
One of t h e s e  (Efran)  involved an i n s t r u c t i o n  advis ing  t h e  s u b j e c t s  
a s  t o  t h e  r u l e  of law under which they should dec ide  t h e  case.  T h i s  
i n s t r u c t i o n ,  however, was no t  manipulated i n  t h e  experiment. The 
o the r  t h r e e  s t u d i e s  (Kaplan & Kernmerick, Mi tchel l  & Byrne 1972 and 
Sue, Smith & Caldwell) involved i n s t r u c t i o n s  a s  t o  t h e  a d m i s s i b i l i t y  
o r  t h e  probat iveness  of some piece  of evidence.  
I n  t h e  Sue, -- e t  a l , experiment t h e  i s s u e  i s  c e r t a i n l y  a r t i f i c a l .  
The j u r o r s  were allowed t o  hear  evidence which might be challenged 
as  v i o l a t i n g  t h e  Fourth Amendment and then  were i n s t r u c t e d  e i t h e r  
t h a t  t h e  evidence was o r  was no t  a l lowable.  I n  a c t u a l  proceedings 
a l l  of t h i s  would have taken p lace  o u t s i d e  of t h e  j u r y ' s  presence. 
The o t h e r  two s t u d i e s  a r e  more r e a l i s t i c  i n  t h a t  t h e  j u d i c i a l  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  at tempt  t o  have j u r o r s  a t t e n d  t o  o r  d i s rega rd  c e r t a i n  
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  information. Since such information might i n  f a c t  
appear i n  an a c t u a l  t r i a l ,  t h e  f i n d i n g s  of t h e s e  experiments have 
r e l a t i v e l y  important  impl ica t ions .  Mi tche l l  & Byrne found, w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  sentencing ,  t h a t  the ins t ruc t i -ons -appeared  t o  have an 
e f f e c t  on low a u t h o r i t a r i a n  p e r s o n a l i t y  j u r o r s ,  b u t  no e f f e c t  on 
high a u t h o r i t a r i a n  p e r s o n a l i t y  j u r o r s .  Unfortunately,  because 
t h e  Sander case  was used t h e r e  was no va r i ance  on g u i l t  and one 
cannot,  t h e r e f o r e ,  conclude whether such an i n s t r u c t i o n  could 
a f f e c t  t h e  v e r d i c t .  
In  t h e  Kaplan & Kernmerick experiment,  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  had 
no s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on e i t h e r  t h e  sentencing  o r  t h e  v e r d i c t s  
of  t h e  jurors . ,  (1974:497): These r e s u l t s  suggest  t h a t  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
may n o t  cause ju ro r s '  t o  d i s rega rd  defendant c h a r a c t e r  evidence. 
However, t h e  c h a r a c t e r  manipulations d i d  n o t  have a  g r e a t  e f f e c t  
on v e r d i c t s  t o  begJn with.  The t a b l e  on p. 496 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  
extreme cases  of p o s i t i v e  and negat ive  c h a r a c t e r  produced only 
about 1 1 / 2  u n i t  s h i f t  on a  20 u n i t  g u i l t  s c a l e .  Thus, t h e r e  
simply was no t  t o o  much b i a s  t h a t  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  could have 
cor rec ted .  Also, t h e  j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  were n o t  a s  mandatory 
i n  na tu re  a s  they might have been. Rather than order ing  t h e  
ju ro r s  t o  d i s rega rd  any charac te r  evidence,  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n  s a i d  
t h a t  such c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s  a r e  o f t e n  inaccura te  and n o t  useful ,"  
(1974:496). 
J u r o r  ~ x p e r i e n c e  
There a r e  problems with t h e s e  experiments t h a t  go beyond t h e  
inadequacy of t h e  courtroom s imula t ion .  The f i r s t  and most obvious 
d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  - a l l  t h e  experiments employ s t u d e n t  sub jec t s .  
We c e r t a i n l y  do n o t  wish t o  argue t h a t  s t u d e n t s  a r e  inappropr ia t e  
s u b j e c t s  f o r  use i n  t h e  s o c i a l  sc i ences .  Research on t h i s  ques t ion  
i s  l i m i t e d  and w e  do n o t  have 'data t h a t  addresses  t h i s  i s s u e  
d i r e c t l y .  However, it i s  reasonable t o  suspec t  t h a t  using s tuden t  
s u b j e c t  responses t o  i n f e r  the 'dec i s ions  of a c t u a l  j u r o r s  r a i s e s  
s e r i o u s  ques t ions  of e x t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y .  Most s t u d e n t s  have had 
no courtroom experience and a r e  probably less l i k e l y  t o  "play" 
t h e  r o l e  of j u r o r  i n  t h e  same way t h a t  a c t u a l  j u r o r s  w i l l .  
De l ibe ra t ions  
A much more s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  t h e  experimental  ju ro r s  
. - 
a r e  r a r e l y  allowed t o  d e l i b e r a t e .  Only i n  t h e  Ezzegt and Leginski 
s tudy d i d  t h e  s tuden t s  d e l i b e r a t e  i n  a jury- l ike  fashion.8 And even 
he re  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n  took p lace  only a f t e r  t h e  s u b j e c t s  had pub l i c ly  
s t a t e d  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  conclusions.  This  kind of p r i o r  pub l i c  
s ta tement  probably has consequences f o r  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n  process.  
9 
The l ack  of  a  d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  more than  any o t h e r  s i n g l e  f a c t o r ,  
p u t s  i n  s e r i o u s  ques t ion  t h e  e x t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  of t h e  r e s u l t s .  I n  
f a c t ,  wi thout  a  d e l i b e r a t i o n  it i s  misleading t o  use t h e  words ju ro r  
o r  jury  a t  a l l  s i n c e  t h e s e  words connote a  group decision-making 
process .  The group dec is ion  allows i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  consol ida te  and 
organize t h e  s t i m u l i  and t o  argue wi th  each o t h e r  about t h e  proper 
grounds of  dec i s ion .  A s  a  consequence, we might hypothesize t h a t  
some.types of information w i l l  be considered l a r g e l y  i r r e l e v a n t ,  
and o t h e r  information w i l l  be considered important.  This seems t o  
be a  f a i r  conclusion of what happened i n  t h e  I z z e t t  & Leginski study. 
The consequence of a group d e l i b e r a t i o n  was t o  wash ou t  any 
sentencing  e f f e c t s  caused by an a t t r a c t i v e  defendant - u n a t t r a c t i v e  
defendant manipulation. Sentencing d i f f e r e n c e s  had been s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n  t h e  p r e L d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  i n d i v i d u a l  v e r d i c t  judgements (1974:275-76). - 
Table  1 p r e s e n t s .  a  summary of t h e  s t u d i e s  .and t h e  n a t u r e  of 
t h e i r  s i m u l a t i o n .  
What conclus ions  should w e  draw from t h e  above review? F i r s t ,  
some of t h e  problems o f . p r e v i o u s  des igns  a r e  easy t o  c o r r e c t ,  and 
r e l a t i v e l y  inexpensive.  The technology f o r  producing and using 
v ideotapes  of t r i a l s  i s  now a v a i l a b l e  i n  most s o c i a l  psychology 
l a b o r a t o r i e s .  Theae appears t o  be l i t t l e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  use 
of t h e  less r e a l i s t i c  method of having j u r o r s  read  s c r i p t s .  
Second, some of t h e  s imula t ion  des ign  problems a r e  such t h a t  
t h e  f i n d i n g s  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  f o r  a c t u a l  jury d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  
For i n s t a n c e ,  some of t h e  evidence in t roduced  i n  t h e  experiments 
simply would never come before  a  ju ry .  I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  examining 
t h e  e f f e c t s  of  such information under b e t t e r  s imula t ion  designs i s  
r e a l l y  a  worthwhile undertaking given t h a t  t h e  goa l  of t h e  research  
i s  t o  l e a r n  something about j u r y  decision-making. The r u l e s  of  
evidence a l r eady  a t tempt  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  types  of d a t a  t h e  jury i s  
allowed t o  cons ide r ,  and t o  see what e f f e c t  such evidence would have 
i s  t o  d i s c u s s  a  counter - fac tua l .  Likewise,  it seems a t  b e s t  very 
a r t i f i c i a l  t o  t e s t  des igns  which make t h e  sen tence  t h e  primary 
dependent v a r i a b l e .  This simply i s  n o t  a  ju ry  t a s k .  
Thi rd ,  t h e r e  a r e  conceptual  problems wi th  some of t h e  des igns .  
One simply cannot conclude anything about  t h e  r e l a t i v e  importance 
of " i r r e l e v a n t "  f a c t o r s  from experiments where only t h e s e  f a c t o r s  
a r e  manipulated.  Experiments which ignore  such a  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  
should no longer  be done a s  jury s t u d i e s .  
F i n a l l y ,  there i s  a  set of e m p i r i c a l  ques t ions  t o  which we 
should direct our attention if we wish to do laboratory research 
which has relevance for the jury system in American society. For 
example, what effect does the deliberation have on results? What 
are the consequences of using students as subjects? 
Below we will present the results from an experiment explicitly 
designed to assess the importance of relevant and irrelevant criteria 
in jury decision-making. As Table 1 indicates, this experiment 
attempts to correct most of the simulation problems that flawed 
the previous jury experiments. This enables us to compare the 
conclusions about the 'rationality of the jury system which are 
derived using different simulation,techniques. In addition the 
present experiment allows us to begin to assess the effects of the 
deliberation and type of subject on the resul:ks of jury decision- 
making. experiments. 
THE EXPERIMENT 
The experiment reported here is a criminal case loosely based 
on the facts and legal issues of Morissette v. United States, 342, 
U.S. 246, 96 L.Ed. 288, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952). Briefly, the case 
involves the nature of the intention which an individual must have 
to be guilty of the federal crime of conversion of government 
i'. . ' ' 
property 18 USC Sec. 641. Morissette took $84.00 worth of old 
army dummy bombshell casings from some land in northern Michigan 
which the Air Force used as a practice bombing range'. There was 
no argument as to whether Morissette took the casings and sold them 
for scrap. He did.so in broad daylight and ,freely admitted he had 
done so. Morissette claimed, .however; that he believed the' casings 
to be abandoned property and that therefore .he did not intend to 
i 
s t e a l  t h e  casings.  
The t r i a l  judge refused  t o  allow t h e  jury t o  consider  t h i s  
excuse, saying ( i n  our  te.rminology) t h a t  t h e  appropr ia t e  respons ib i -  
l i t y  r u l e  only requ i red  t h a t  t h e  defendant have the'  genera l  Yntent 
t o  take .  H e  d i d  n o t  have t o  possess  t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  t o  s t e a l .  
- - . - - - -- - -- - - -- - 
( ~ h i s  p o s i t i o n  was upheld by t h e  c o u r t  of appeals ,  b u t , t h e  
Supreme Court, pe r  J u s t i c e  Jackson, unanimously reversed.  
A case  was devised which would incorpora te ,  among o t h e r  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  i s s u e  of i n t e n t  r a i s e d  i n  Morisse t te  v. U.S-. The, 
f a c t s  of t h e  exper imen ta l . case  a r e  t h a t  approximately 9 months. 
a f t e r  a  bu i ld ing  has burned down on a  p i e c e  of proper ty  on t h e  out- 
s k i r t s  of a  town, a r e t i r e d  c i t i z e n ,  named William Har r i s ,  who 
l i v e d  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  removed a laa rge  p i l e  of uncleaned b r i c k s  and used 
some of them t o  b u i l d  an outdoor barbecue. A s  t h e  a c t  of t ak ing  t h e  
b r i c k s  occurred dur ing  t h e  a f t e r n o o n , . i t  was observed by a  woman who 
l i v e d  across  t h e  s t r e e t  from t h e  proper ty .  She recognized Harr i s  
and repor ted  t h e  event  t o  t h e  p o l i c e  when they quest ioned h e r  i n  
t h e  course of t h e i r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  about t h e  missing b r i cks .  A s  a  
r e s u l t ,  Har r i s  was a r r e s t e d  and charged with the- tk ief t tof  ., the ,*b~i 'cks .  
A t  t h e  t i m e  of h i s  a r r e s t ,  and throughout h i s  testimony, Har r i s  
claimed t h a t  he thought t h a t  t h e  b r i c k s  had been abandoned. 
The t r i a l  was presented t o  t h e  s u b j e c t s  i n  t h e  experiment by 
means of a  videotape of a  courtroom procedure.  Attempts were made 
t o  assure  t h e  b e l i e v a b i l i t y  of t h e  t r i a l  b u t  t h e  s u b j e c t s  were 
informed a t  t h e  o u t s e t  t h a t  it was s taged and t h a t  c e r t a i n  a spec t s  
of an a c t u a l  t r i a l  ( f o r  example, t h e  a t t o r n e y ' s  opening and c los ing  
arguments) w e r e  omit ted.  
The f i r s t  p a r t  o f . t h e  videotape cons i s t ed  o f ' t h e  testimony 
( inc luding  some cross-examination test5mony) of four  witnesses .  
The wi tnesses  were: t h e  owner of t h e  p roper ty ,  t h e  woman who 
l i v e d  ac ross  t h e  street from t h e  proper ty ,  t h e  a r r e s t i n g  o f f i c e r  
/ 
and t h e  defendant.  The testimonyq:was i d e n t i c a l  for- a&ls+er,sions of 
-, - - -- ' < 
t h e  experiment wi th  t h e  exception of t h e ' i d e n t i t y  of t h e  owner of 
property and c e r t a i n  circumstances r e l a t i n g  t o  h i s  use of t h e  
property and how he came t o  discover  t h a t  t h e  b r i c k s  were missing. 
I n  Kalf of t h e  t r i a l s  t h e  owner of t h e  proper ty  was t h e  S t a t e  of 
Michigan and a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f o r  t h e  , ~ t ~ t e - - ~ r e s e n t e d  . - testimony 
i n  t h e  t r i a l .  I n . t h e  remainder of t h e  t r i a l s ,  t h e  property was 
owned by a  p r i v a t e  ind iv idua l  and he t e s t i f i e s . .  Through these  
manipulations,  t h e  f a c t s  of t h e  case remained v i r t u a l l y  unchanged 
i - .  -- 
w h i l e  t h e  l l s i z & l l o ~ f  tthe&&&& b a r i e d  .(a~?.. - 
- -- - - - - 
Af ter t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  wi tnesses  ' testimony (which takes  
about 10 minutes) ,  t h e  judge g'ave,his i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  t h e  jury a s  
t o  t h e  law a p p l i c a b l e  i n  t h i s  case.  ~ h e s e ' i n s t r u c t i o n s  were d e t a i l e d  
. - ?  
and covered a  wide range of l e g a l  cons ide ra t ions .  Among these  
i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  two a d d i t i o n a l  experimental  v a r i a b l e s  were introduced. 10 
One v a r i a b l e  c o n s i s t s  of t h e  degree t o  which t h e  jurors  a r e  
expected t o  fol low t h e  judges i n s t r u c t i o n s .  A t  t h e  beginning of 
h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h e  judge e i t h e r  informs t h e  jury t h a t  it i s  t h e i r  
duty t o  determine t h e  f a c t s ,  and t o  determine them only from t h e  
evidence i n  t h i s  case ,  and t h a t  it i s  t h e i r  duty t o  apply t h e  law, 
a s  t h e  judge s t a t e s  it, t o  the  f a c t s ,  and i n  t h i s  way decide*?. t h e  
case.  (Here inaf te r ,  t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n  i s  c a l l e d  . judge  law. ) ' O r  -
t h e  judge says  t h a t  whatever he t e l l s  them about t h e  law, while it 
is  intended t o  be h e l p f u l  t o  them ,in reaching  a j u s t  and proper 
v e r d i c t  i n  t h e  case ,  it i s  n o t  binding upon t h e  members of t h e  jury,  
and t h e  jury may accept  t h e  law a s  they apprehend it t o  be i n  t h e  
case .  th ere in after t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n  i s  c a l l e d  bury law.) 
A t  a . l a t e r  p o i n t  i n  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  t h e  judge p resen t s  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  i n t e n t  necessary t o  f i n d  t h e  defendant g u i l t y .  
The a l t e r n a t i v e s  of genera l  o r  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  a r e  def ined ,  respeck 
t i v e l y ,  a s :  
I n  determining t h e  defendant ' s  i n t e n t i o n ,  t h e  law assumes 
t h a t  every person in tends  t h e  n a t u r a l  cons-equences of h i s  
voluntary  a c t s .  Therefore,  t h e  de fendan t ' s  i n t e n t i o n  i s  
i n f e r r e d  from h i s  voluntary commission of t h e  a c t  forbidden 
by law, and it is  n o t  necessary t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  t h e  -
defendant  knew t h a t  h i s  a c t  was a  v i o l a t i o n  of law. 
O r ,  - t h e  crime charged i n  t h i s  case  r e q u i r e s  proof of 
s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  before  t h e  defendant  can be convicted.  
S p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  means more than t h e  genera l  i n t e n t  t o  
commit t h e  a c t .  To e s t a b l i s h  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  t h e  
government must prove t h a t  t h e  defendant  knowingly d i d  
an a c t  which t h e  law f o r b i d s ,  purposely in tending  t o  
v i o l a t e  t h e  law. Such i n t e n t  may be determined from 
a l l _ f a c t s  and circumstances surrounding t h e  case. The 
word- "knowingly" means t h a t  t h e  a c t  was done v o l u n t a r i l y  
and purposely,  and n o t  because of mistake o r  accident .  
Knowledge may be proven by t h e  de fendan t ' s  conduct, and 
by a l l  t h e  f a c t s  and circumstances surrounding t h e  
case.  No person can i n t e n t i o n a l l y  avoid knowledge 
by c l o s i n g  h i s  e  e s  t o  f a c t s  which should prompt him 
t o  i n v e s t i g a t e .  d 
Again, each jury rece ives  t h e  same i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  except  f o r  
L- 
t h e  s l i g h t  v a r i a t i o n s  descr ibed above. The experimental  design 
can t h e r e f o r e  be summarized a s  follows: 
INTENT 
General S p e c i f i c  
The two v a r i a b l e s  on the heading r e l a t e  t o  t h e  importance,of  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - r u l e .  The dimension of judge law-jury law e s t a b l i s h e s  
whether,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  jury i s  bound by t h e  set  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
r u l e s  presented  by t h e  judge. The s p e c i f i c  in t en t -gene ra l  i n t e n t  
v a r i a b l e  d e f i n e s  e x p l i c i t l y  one key element of t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
r u l e  i n  t h i s  case .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s t a t e  vs .  i n d i v i d u a l  v a r i a b l e  
in t roduces  one i r r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r  which may produce va r i ance  i n  
jury  v e r d i c t s .  This  d i s t i n c t i o n  has  produced d i f f e r e n t  assessments 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  among respondents  i n  a  l a r g e  s c a l e  a t t i t u d e  
survey (Smigel, 1956) . 
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SUBJECTS 
Judge Law 
The s u b j e c t s  w e r e  drawn from two sources .  The ma jo r i ty  of  
Ju ry  Law Judge Law 
s u b j e c t s  w e r e  from t h e  C i r c u i t  and D i s t r i c t  Courts of  Washtenaw 
Jury  Law 
County (Ann Arbor) Michigan. These i n d i v i d u a l s  w e r e  a c t u a l  j u r o r s  
who had j u s t  completed a  two month t e r m  i n  t h e s e  c o u r t s .  W e  
r eques ted  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  from a l l  t h e  j u r o r s  w e  w e r e  a b l e  t o  c o n t a c t  
and achieved a participation rate of about 35% of all eligible 
jurors. 12 
The second pool of subjects were college students enrolled 
in introductory sociology classes at the University of Michigan. 
Participation by these subjects was associated with the fulfillment 
of the laboratory requirement, but the subjects were not compelled 
to participate. 
All subjects were scheduled to participate in groups of eight. 
After a brief introduction, each person received a one-page 
summary of the facts of the case and the charge against the 
defendant. This document was read aloud to the subjects and they 
then viewed the video-tape. A short break,occured between the 
testimony and the judicial instructions, where the experimenter 
explained what was to follow. After the videotape was shown, _ _ - -- 
C - 
I 
the Washtenaw Count subjects were asked to deliberate and reach J - ._y.:. - - -  - 
a verdict. The student subjects did not deliberate. 
In the case of the Washtenaw 'bounty jurors the juries con- 
sisted of 5 oa,6 members. l3 Therefore, if more than six subjects 
came for the experiment these-additional members were drawn off 
randomly and were interviewed immediately concerning their 
individual opinion. In addition, extra juries were run, none 
of whose members deliberated. This was done in order to increase 
the number of non-deliberating jurors. These jurors, like those 
randomly drawn off, and like the student jurors were interviewed 
immediately after viewing the videotape. Thus each cell of the 
experimental design contained six deliberating juries and 10 to 14 
student subjects. In addition data was collected on a total of 
40 non-deliberating Washtenaw County jurors. 
The d e l i b e r a t i n g  ju ro r s  were interviewed i n d i v i d u a l l y  a f t e r  
t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n .  The d e l i b e r a t i o n  was taped and t h i s  f a c t  was made 
known t o  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  before they began d e l i b e r a t i n g .  I f  a  
v e r d i c t  was n o t  reached i n  30 minutes t h e  s u b j e c t s  were informed 
t h a t  they would have approximately 5  a d d i t i o n a l  minutes t o  make a  
dec is ion .  I f  no dec i s ion  was reached a f t e r  t h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  per iod 
t h e  jury was considered t o  be hung. 
ANALYSIS 
To r e p e a t ,  a  r ecur r ing  conclusion throughout much of t h e  
previous jury research  i s  t h a t  ju ro r s  use evidence t h a t  i s  n o t  
l e g a l l y  r e l e v a n t  i n  deciding cases .  By p resen t ing  t h e  r e s u l t s  
from our  own experiment, we w i l l  examine whether t h e s e  conclusions 
could have been due t o  t h e  concep tua l i za t ion  of t h e  research:and 
t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  s imulat ion.  
The Decisions of Del ibera t ing  J u r o r s  
Table 2 p resen t s  a  contingency t a b l e  of t h e  t h r e e  experimentally 
manipulated v a r i a b l e s  by v e r d i c t  f o r  d e l i b e r a t i n g  Washtenaw County 
jurors .  l4 The chi-square values f o r  main e f f e c t s  a r e  a l s o  presented.  
The dependent v a r i a b l e  i n  t h i s  t a b l e  i s  a  dichotomy of g u i l t y  
v e r d i c t s  versus n o t  g u i l t y  v e r d i c t s .  15 
It  i s  c l e a r  from t h e  t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  v a r i a b l e  i s  
most s t r o n g l y  r e l a t e d  t o  juror  v e r d i c t .  The i n s t r u c t i o n  v a r i a b l e  
i s  next  i n  importance, while t h e  " s i z e "  of v ic t im v a r i a b l e  i s  
marginally important.  
J u r o r s  under t h e  genera l  i n t e n t  i n s t r u c t i o n  a r e  more l i k e l y  
t o  f i n d  t h e  defendant g u i l t y .  This  fo l lows from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  judge has  i n s t r u c t e d  t h e . j u r y  t h a t  t h e  only r e l e v a n t  i s s u e  
i s  whether o r  n o t  t h e  defendant  took t h e  b r i c k s  and t h i s  i s  f r e e l y  
admit ted by a l l  t h e  wi tnesses  i n  t h e  tes t imony.  Under t h e  s p e c i f i c  
i n t e n t  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  however, t h e  ' j u r o r  h a s - . t o  dec ide  f u r t h e r  
q u e s t i o n s  about  t h e  de fendan t ' s  i n t e n t i o n .  This  i s  d i spu ted  i n  
t h e  t h e  t r i a l .  Given t h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t  one would expect  
fewer g u i l t y  v e r d i c t s  i f  j u r o r s  a r e  a c t u a l l y  bas ing  t h e i r  v e r d i c t s  
on- - l ~ e ~ . l 7 2 y  r e l e v a n t  c r i t e r i a  (i. e. , dec id ing  t h e  case  according 
t o  t h e  r u l e s  which the']judge sets o u t  f o r  them). This expec ta t ion  
i s  confirmed by t h e  d a t a .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  when t h e  judge informs t h e  j u r o r s  t h a t  they must 
fo l low t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  he g i v e s  them, we.would expec t  more 
g u i l t y  v e r d i c t s  than when he a l lows each j u r o r  t o  dec ide  both t h e  
law and t h e  f a c t s  of  t h e  case .  Again, our  expec ta t ions  a r e  con- 
f irmed by t h e  d a t a  -- j u r o r s  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  f i n d  t h e  defendant 
g u i l t y  under t h e  " judge law" i n s t r u c t i o n .  
While w e  would have p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  t h e  " s i z e "  of v i c t i m  ( a  
l e g a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  f a c t )  should have no r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  v e r d i c t ,  
t h e  d a t a  show t h a t  when t h e  v i c t i m  is  a  p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  j u ro r s  
a r e  s l i g h t l y  more l i k e l y  t o  f i n d  t h e  defendant  g u i l t y .  16 
W e  a l s o  have some d a t a  which addresses  t h e  ques t ion  of whether 
t h e  choice  of a  dependent v a r i a b l e  a f f e c t s  r e s u l t s .  We,asked our 
s u b j e c t s  ( r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e i r  own v e r d i c t )  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  sentence 
t h a t  they thought  t h e  defendant  should r e c e i v e  i n  t h i s  case .  Table 
3 p r e s e n t s  t h e  c r o s s  t a b u l a t i o n s  of recommended f ine tGf i r s t* -_by  
" s i z e "  of v i c t i m  and then by i n t e n t  f o r  d e l i b e r a t i n g  j u r o r s .  Note 
t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  f o r  t h e  i r r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r  of " s i z e "  of v i c t im  now 
e x h i b i t s  a s t r o n g e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  t h e  dependent v a r i a b l e  than 
does i n t e n t .  This  f i n d i n g  i s  cons i . s t en t  w i th  '.our reasoning t h a t  
a d d i t i o n a l  c r i t e r i a  (e .g . ,  s e r i o u ~ n e s s ~ ~ f t h e  o f f nse )  may be more 
r e l e v a n t  f o r  j u r o r s  making sen tenc ing  d e c i s i o n s  than  f o r  j u r o r s  
dec id ing  g u i l t  o r  innocence.  Sentence i s  no t  an a p p r o p r i a t e  
s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  v e r d i c t  i n  experiments involv ing  decision-making 
where t h e  r e s u l t s  w i l l  be  gene ra l i zed  t o  t h e  ju ry  system. 
Therefore ,  as w e  expected (and con t ra ry  to:~~rn~s.t of t h e  conclusions 
reached by previous  r e s e a r c h e r s  on jury  decision-making),  t h e  d a t a  
show t h a t  l e g a l l y  r e l e v a n t  c r i t e r i a  a r e  those  most important  t o  
j u r o r s  i n  dec id ing  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I n  reaching  a v e r d i c t  j u ro r s  
do use t h e  r u l e s  se t  o u t  f o r  them by t h e  judge. 
It is  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  w e  a r e  a c t u a l l y  underes t imat ing  t h e  amount 
of j u r o r  r a t i o n a l i t y  when w e  examine t h e  s imple r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
v e r d i c t  and l e g a l  r u l e s  f o r  d e c i s i o n .  To g e t  a more complete 
p i c t u r e  of  t h e  decision-making process  it i s  a l s o  necessary t o  examine 
t h e  way i n  which j u r o r s  i n t e r p r e t  evidence w i t h i n  t h e  contex t  of 
l e g a l  r u l e s .  For example, i f  a j u r o r  d i d  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  
defendant  thought  t h e  b r i c k s  w e r e  abandoned, then  even under t h e  
s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  cond i t ion ,  t h e  defendant  should be found g u i l t y .  
O r ,  a j u r o r  may have be l i eved  t h e  de fendan t ' s  a s s e r t i o n s ,  b u t  y e t  
thought t h a t  a r easonab le  person would have a c t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  i n  
t h e  same s i t u a t i o n .  I n  t h i s  case  a l s o ,  t h e  j u r o r  would have been 
a c t i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  l e g a l  framework s e t  up by t h e  judge by f ind ing  
Har r i s  ( t h e  defendant )  - g u i l t y .  
I n  the post-experimental  i n t e rv iew w e  asked a l l  s u b j e c t s  
whether they thought  t h a t  H a r r i s  be l i eved  t h e  b r i c k s  t o  be abandoned 
(reasonable defendant v a r i a b l e )  and whether a  reasonable person 
would have thought t h a t  t h e  b r i c k s  w e r e  abandoned (reasonable 
person v a r i a b l e ) .  Both ques t ions  were coded on a seven po in t  
s c a l e  from s t r o n g l y  agree  (7) t o  s t r o n g l y  d i sagree  (1) . 
When t h e  means on t h e  two v a r i a b l e s  are examined f o r  groups 
cons t ruc ted  by combinations of i n t e n t  and v e r d i c t ,  t h e  importance 
of r e l e v a n t  c r i t e r i a  i n  ju ro r  decision-making i s  considerably 
increased.  Note i n  Table 4 t h a t  t h e  mean on t h e  reasonable 
defendant v a r i a b l e  i s  6.22 i n  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  cases  where t h e  
defendant was found n o t  g u i l t y  and only 4.13 i n  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  
cases  where he was found g u i l t y .  This  means t h a t  those ju ro r s  
who thought Har r i s  was g u i l t y  had doubts about h i s  i n t e n t .  They 
were l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  be l i eve  t h a t  he thought t h e  b r i c k s  were 
abandoned. S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  means on t h e  reasonable person v a r i a b l e  
a r e  5.42 and 2.62 f o r  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  cases  where t h e  defendant 
was found n o t  g u i l t y  and g u i l t y ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  17 
Furthermore, it ' is poss ib le  f o r  a  ju ro r  t o  consider  " s i z e "  of 
.victim i n  reaching a  v e r d i c t  i n  a  way t h a t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with a  
l e g a l  model of t h e  jury dec i s ion  process .  There a r e  circumstances 
under which such information about t h e  v ic t im i s  l e g a l l y  r e l evan t .  
For example, t h e  j u r o r  may want t o  use t h i s  information i n  t h e  
s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  cases  t o  determine whether t h e  defendant was 
a c t i n g  reasonably by th inking  t h a t  t h e  b r i c k s  were abandoned. A 
j u ro r  might reason t h a t  b r i c k s  on s t a t e  land look abandoned 
bu t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  an unreasonable conclusion when t h e  b r i cks  a r e  
on p r i v a t e  property.  I n  f a c t ,  it does appear from t h e  d a t a  t h a t  
t h i s  is  t h e  'case. When t h e  s p e c i f i c  and genera l  i n t e n t  condi t ions  
are cons ide red  s e p a r a t e l y  w e  f i n d  t h a t  t h e r e . i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  the " s i z e "  of v i c t i m  w i t h  v e r d i c t  on ly  i n  s p e c i f i c  
i n t e n t  c a s e s  (x2 = 5.566,. df = 1, p  < . 0 2 ) .  For ,  g e n e r a l  i n t e n t  
c a s e s ,  there i.s no r e l a t i o n s h i p -  (x2 = .0938, d f  = 1, p  > . 70 ) .  
Given these r e s u l t s ,  w e  conclude t h a t  j u r o r s  do use  evidence 
i n  a l e g a l l y  r e l e v a n t  f a sh ion  and t h a t  t hey  conform t o  t h e  model 
of  j u ry  decision-making set f o r t h  i n  t h e  law. Our own view con- 
trasts g r e a t l y  w i t h  t h e  conc lus ions  reached  by many of t h e  prev ious  
s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  doing r e s e a r c h  i n  t h i s  area. While we do n o t  
wish t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of t h e i r  r e s u l t s ,  w e  t h i n k  t h a t  it 
i s  neces sa ry  t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h e y  draw from t h e i r  
r e s u l t s  t o  t h e  j u ry  system. The methodology and c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  
o f  t h e  ear l ier  work i s  flawed i n  such a way t h a t  w e  cannot  accep t  
t h e  conc lus ions  r ega rd ing  t h e  p roces s  o f  j u ry  decision-making. We 
have shown t h a t  improving t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  technique  and des ign ing  
an exper iment  w i t h  r e l evance  f o r  t h e  j u r y  system,  r e s u l t s  kncva_st- 
ly d i f f e r e n t  conc lus ions  about  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  j u ry  decision-making. 
The, Dec is ions  o f   on-deliberating 'Students 
To emphasize t h e  importance of  t h e  methodological  des ign ,  w e  
w i l l  now d i s c u s s  t h e  r e s u l t s  of a  r e p l i c a t i o n  us ing  s t u d e n t  s u b j e c t s  
who d i d  n o t  d e l i b e r a t e  t o  reach  t h e i r  v e r d i c t s .  With t h i s  d a t a  we 
can beg in  t o  add res s  some e m p i r i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  which should be o f  
concern t o  r e s e a r c h e r s  doing ju ry  s t u d i e s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  w e  w i l l  
comment on t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  of t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n  a s  a t o o l  of  t h e  ju ry  
and on t h e  a b i l i t y  of s t u d e n t  s u b j e c t s  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  r e a l  j u r o r s .  
Table  5  p r e s e n t s  t h e  cont ingency t a b l e  of v e r d i c t  by t h e  t h r e e  
expe r imen ta l ly  manipulated v a r i a b l e s  f o r  t h e  s t u d e n t s .  None of  
t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  demonstrates a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with t h e  
dependent v a r i a b l e .  An examination of this t a b l e  alone would lead  
t o  t h e  conclusion t h a t  jury decision-making i s  a  t o t a l l y  random 
process .  W e  even f a i l e d  t o  r e p l i c a t e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  
l e g a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r  ("s ize"  of v ic t im)  and v e r d i c t .  One 
might have expected t h a t  s i n c e  our  r e p l i c a t i o n - w i t h  s tuden t s  was 
c l o s e ~ ~ i n  design t o  t h e  e a r l i e r  a t tempts  t o  study jury decis ion-  
making, t h a t  t h e  e a r l i e r  f ind ings -  of j u r o r  i r r a t i o n a l i t y  ( i . e . ,  use 
of l e g a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  evidence) would have been reproduced. They ,' 
w e r e  no t .  l8 However, we a l s o  d i d  n o t  rep&duce our own f indings  
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concerning ju ro r  use of l e g a l  r u l e s  i n  decision-making. The con- 
t r a s t  of t h e  s t u d e n t  d a t a  with t h a t  f o r  t h e  " r e a l "  ju ro r s  i s  
remarkable. 
When we in t roduce  t h e  reasonableness  v a r i a b l e s  however, t h e  
a t t r i b u t i o n s  of t h e  s t u d e n t s  begin t o  look less random and more 
l i k e  t h e  a t t r i b u t i o n s  of  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i n g  ju ro r s .  Table 6 presents  
t h e  means f o r  s t u d e n t s  on t h e  reasonable defendant and reasonable 
person v a r i a b l e s .  Again, these  means a r e  computed on groups made 
up of combinations of i n t e n t  and v e r d i c t .  S imi la r  t o  t h e  ju ro r s ,  
t h e  means on t h e  two v a r i a b l e s  were h igher  f o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t -  
n o t  g u i l t y  group than f o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t -  g u i l t y  group (6.0 
vs .  4.68 f o r  t h e  reasonable defendant , .var iable ,  and 5.38 vs.  3.8 
f o r  t h e  reasonable person v a r i a b l e ) .  19 
Therefore,  it appears from t h i s  d a t a  t h a t  t h e  s tuden t s  a r e  
using some r e l e v a n t  c r i t e r i a  i n  making dec i s ions  about r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
However, they a r e  n o t  using t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  
d e l i b e r a t i n g  ju ro r s  do. Furthermore, they a r e  completely ignoring 
t h e  l e g a l  r u l e s  t h a t  t h e  judge provides i n  h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
The type  of s u b j e c t  used i n  t h e  experiment and whether o r  n o t  
t h e  j u r o r s  a r e  allowgd t o  d e l i b e r a t e t o  r e a c h ' a  v e r d i c t  together  
a r e  c r u c i a l  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  determinat ion of t h e  ' r e s u l t s  of t h e  
s tudy.  Unfortunately,  our  own d a t a  do n o t  permit us t o ' a s s i g n  
r e l a t i v e  importance t o  each of t h e s e  two f a c t o r s .  1 n . o r d e r  t o  do 
t h i s ,  it would be n e c e s s a r y - t o  r e p l i c a t e  our  experiment using non- 
d e l i b e r a t i n g  " r e a l "  j u r o r s  and d e l i b e r a t i n g  s tuden t s .  W e  t r i e d  t o  
do t h i s  on a  small  s c a l e  with t h e  nonde l ibe ra t ing  ju ro r s .  The 
smal l  number of cases  and uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n  of cases  t o  c e l l s  
i n  t h e  experimental  design ( d e s p i t e  random assignment of sub jec t s  
t o  c e l l s )  however, do n o t  permit us  t o  draw conclusions about how 
t h e  nondel ibera t ing  j u r o r s  decide t h e  case.  We never the less  p resen t  
t h e  contingency t a b l e  f o r  nondel ibera t ing  ju ro r s  i n  Table 7.  
- - - - - - . - - - . - - - - .. - - - - .. 
I n  genera l  it seems t h a t  t h e  process  of  decision-making I - - - --.. - -  - -  - . .  - - -  
f o r  t h e s e  ju ro r s  f a l l s  somewhere i n  between t h a t  of t h e  s tuden t s  
and t h e  d e l i b e r a t i n g  ju ro r s .  
Even though we do n o t  have comparable d a t a  on t h e  decis ion-  
making processes  of groups of s t u d e n t  d e l i b e r a t o r s  we do have 
a d d i t i o n a l  evidence t h a t  w i l l  al low us  t o  spec i fy  some of t h e  ways 
t h a t  s tuden t s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  from experienced ju ro r s  and d e l i b e r a t o r s  
a r e  d i f f e r e n t  from ju ro r s  deciding t h e  case  ind iv idua l ly .  
A b i l i t y  t o  Remember . Ins t ruc t ions  
Recal l  t h e  hyppthesis  t h a t  it i s  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  non- 
d e l i b e r a t o r s  t o  c o r r e c t l y  remember a l l  of t h e  judge 's  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
Without t h e  b e n e f i t  of a group d i scuss ion  some po in t s  w i l l  be missed 
o r  misunderstood. When ju ro r s  a r e  allowed t o  d i scuss  t h e  case among 
themselves t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  v e r d i c t ,  t h e r e  i s  a  g r e a t e r  chance t h a t  
each of t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t s  of t h e  judge ' s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  w i l l  be 
remembered. T h i s  w i l l  occur because d i f f e r e n t  ind iv idua l s  w i l l  a t t e n d  
t o  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  of t h e  testimony and i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
I n  t h e  post-experimental in t e rv iew w e  ask a l l  of our sub jec t s  
. t o  r e c a l l  key p o i n t s  of t h e  judge 's  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  20 Thirty-nine 
pe rcen t  of t h e  d e l i b e r a t i n g  j u r o r s ,  47% of t h e  non-del iberat ing 
ju ro r s  and 45% of t h e  s tuden t s  e i t h e r  d i d  n o t  remember t h e  judge's 
i n s t r u c t i o n  about i n t e n t  o r  remembered it i n c o r r e c t l y .  These 
/ 
percentages a r e  even more s t r i k i n g  when we cons ider  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
a l l  of t h e  s t u d e n t s  and nondel ibera t ing  ju ro r s  were asked t h i s  
ques t ion  immediately fol lowing t h e  ~ v i d e o ~ a p & e . ~ O f  t h e judge 's  
- - 2 :  , 
i n s t r u c t i o n s .  There was on t h e  average a  5-10 minute w a i t ~ f o r  these  
s u b j e c t s  t o  be interviewed.  The d e l i b e r a t i n g  j u r o r s  had t o  complete 
t h e i r  d e l i b e r a t i o n  before  any of them were interviewed and t h e i r  
w a i t  a f t e r  t h a t  averaged between 15-20 minutes. This p iece  of 
evidence emphasizes t h e  u s e f u l l n e s s  of t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n  f o r  remember- 
i n g  and understanding t h e  judge's i n s t r u c t i o n s . .  
When we cons ider  how w e l l  t h e  s u b j e c t s  remembered what t h e  
judge had t o  say about  t h e  duty of j u r o r s  t o  obey h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  
we g e t  a  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  p i c t u r e .  For ty  pe rcen t  of t h e  d e l i b e r a t -  
ing  j u r o r s ,  34% of t h e  nondel ibera t ing  j u r o r s  and 52% of t h e  s tuden t s  
e i t h e r  d i d  n o t  remember o r  i n c o r r e c t l y  repeated t h e  meaning of t h i s  
p a r t  of t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  This f i n d i n g  i s  b e s t  i n t e r p r e t e d  as  
being due t o  t h e  previous courtroom experience of t h e  ju ro r s .  I n  
conversat ions wi th  t h e  ju ro r s  a f t e r  t h e  experiment and during t h e  de- 
- - . A  - . ~-. ~ . - - -  ~- -.. - .  
l i b e r a t i o n ,  we learned  t h a t  j u r o r s  hear ing  t h e  jury law i n s t r u c t i o n  were - -  - - -- . * -- 
I p u i t e  su rp r i sed .  For two months they had been accustomed t o  hearing 
- - -  
t h e  judge say t h a t  they must fol low h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  The novel ty ' 
of the jury l a w  i n s t r u c t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  made it r e l a t i v e l y  easy t o  
remember. Using t h e  same l o g i c  w e  conclude t h a t  t h e  judge law 
i n s t r u c t i o n  was f a i r l y  automatic f o r  j u r o r s  t o  r e p e a t  and they could 
do t h i s  without  having t o  r e c a l l  t h e  words t h e  judge used i n  our  
p a r t i c u l a r  case.  The s t u d e n t s ,  who lacked t h i s  p r i o r  experience,  
had no cause t o  e i t h e r  a t t e n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n  o r  
t o  recognize it a s  an i n t r i n s i c  p a r t  of t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o -  t h e  
j ury . 
Playing t h e  Role of J u r o r  
With t h e  preceeding explanat ion  w e  have introduced a  second 
'.hypothesis :. t h a t ,  t o  a  c e r t a i n  e x t e n t ,  s tuden t s -  a r e  e i t h e r -  unwi l l ing  
o r  unable t o  play t h e  r o l e  of ju ro r .  For t h e  most p a r t ,  they lack  
t h e  experience of being i n  a  courtroom and have never l i s t e n e d  t o  
a  judge inform them about t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of a  ju ro r .  Every 
ju ro r  i n  our experiment (even those  who-did n o t  s i t  on any cases  
dur ing  t h e i r  time a s  j u r o r s  i n  Washtenaw County) had . t h i s  experience.  
During t h e  post-experimental  intervPew we asked t h e  s u b j e c t s ,  
"What is t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e  j u r y ' s  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  obey t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
t h e  judge g ives  a s  t o  t h e  law?" The responses t o  t h i s  c losed  
ques t ion  w e r e  a s  follows: 68% of t h e  d e l i b e r a t i n g  ju ro r s  s a i d  t h a t  
ju ro r s  must -obey t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h e  judge g ives ,  23% thought t h a t  
j u r o r s  should obey t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  except  under s p e c i a l  circumstances,  
w h i l e  only 10% thought t h a t  ju ro r s  should do j u s t i c e  between t h e  
p a r t i e s  r ega rd less  of t h e  judge ' s ins t ruc t ions . .  21 ~ ~ h e s c o r r ~ L ~ 6 n d i n ~  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  t h e  nondel ibera t ing  j u r o r s  was 6 2 % ,  22% and 16%,  
and f o r  s tuden t s ,  52%, 2 4 % ,  and 24%, respec t ive ly .  This  d a t a  c l e a r l y  
suppor ts  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r i o r  courtroom experience of a  
s u b j e c t  a f f e c t s  h i s  o r  h e r  percept ion  of t h e  rsole of ju ro r .  I t  . - 
i s  f u r t h e r  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  p r i o r  experience a l s o  could a f f e c t  t h e  
wi l l ingness  of t h e  s u b j e c t  t o  s e r i o u s l y  accept  t h a t  r o l e  i n  a  
l abora to ry  experiment, b u t  we have no d a t a  which address  t h e  l a t t e r  
i s s u e .  
DISCUSSION 
W e  must reiterate our  content ion  t h a t  t h e  methodology of t h e s e  
experiments is a  f a c t o r  t h a t  must be s e r i o u s l y  considered when 
eva lua t ing  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  t h a t  r e sea rcher s  p lace  upon t h e i r  
da ta .  We have shown t h a t  t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  s imula t ion  ( i . e . f  
t h e  use of vide<%lpes$ and r e a l i s t i c  p r e s e n t a t i o n )  and t h e  concep- - - 
t u a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  problem under i n v e s t i g a t i o n  ( i . e . ,  t h e  choice 
of a  dependent v a r i a b l e ,  t h e  re levance  of  t h e  manipulations) a f f e c t  
t h e  conclusions one reaches about t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  of t h e  jury system. 
I n  add i t ion ,  we have demonstrated t h a t  o t h e r  methodological considera- 
t i o n s  -- t h e  type of s u b j e c t  used, t h e  presence o r  absence of 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s  -- w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  r e s u l t s  of decision-making experiments. 
There i s  a  need f o r  more research  of t h i s  type.  While our  own 
work provided some c l u e s  a s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  of d e l i b e r a t i o n s  and 
inexperienced s u b j e c t s ,  it i s  n o t  conclusive.  We have found t h a t  
both f a c t o r s  make a  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  way s u b j e c t s  a c t  a s  ju ro r s  t o  
decide a  case.  Our f e e l i n g  i s  t h a t  having a d e l i b e r a t i o n  i s  by 
f a r  t h e  most c r u c i a l  cons idera t ion  i n  t h e  design of a  jury experiment 
(beyond t h e  obvious necess i ty  of a  proper s imula t ion) .  However, 
(before t h i s  can be s t a t e d  with  conviction^; i t  i s  necessary t h a t  
d a t a  be c o l l e c t e d  on groups of s t u d e n t  d e l i b e r a t o r s .  
Our d a t a  f o r  d e l i b e r a t i n g  ju ro r s  suggest  t h a t  j u d i c i a l  i n -  
s t r u c t i o n s  can e x e r t  cons iderable  c o n t r o l  over the dec i s ions  of 
j u r i e s .  C e r t a i n l y ,  an important a r e a  of f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  (and.one 
t h a t  would provide 'useful  information t o  lawyers and judges) i s  
t o  spec i fy  t h e  cond i t ions '  unders which judgs can a f  f e c t  jury out- 
comes and t o  i n d i c a t e  which types of i n s t r u c t i o n s  a r e  important 
i n  determining t h e  types  of evidence t h a t  t h e  jury w i l l  consider .  
$\ 
/' 
~h~&%i'ssues of e x t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  and c a r e f u l  methodological 
design t h a t  we h'ave r a i s e d  throughout t h i s  paper axe important  
p r e c i s e l y  because t h e  research  we have d iscussed  purpor ts  t o  have 
;y' 
impl ica t ions  f o r  t h e  jury system. I f  r e sea rcher s  a r e  going t o  t r y  
t o  e x e r t  in f luence  i n  a reas  ou t s ide  of s o c i a l  psychological  theory ,  
they must begin t o  conduct t h e i r  research  more respons ib ly  and be 
aware of t h e  .requirements of e x t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  before  &king broad 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  from t h e i r  r e s u l t s .  I f  t h i s  research  i s  t o  be 
done it must be done c o r r e c t l y .  I f  it cannot be done c o r r e c t l y ,  
change t h e  t i t l e !  
TABLE 1 
EXPERIMENTS AND SIMULATION TECHNIQUES 
Threats t o  External  Va l id i ty  
Experiment ituden; Non-De- Use of Indepen- No No Opening & No Relevant Sentence a s  No No I n s t r u c t i o n  
Juror  l i b e r a t o r  Sc r ip t  dent Cross Closing Argu. Variable Dependent J u d i c i a l  About Relevance 
I 
Variable Exam. of Attorneys Manipulation Variable Rule of Evidence 
Ef ran x x x x x x x 0.k. 0.k. x - .,1 2 
G r i f f i t t  & 
Jackson I x x 
- - 
I z z e t t  & 
Leg i n s k i  x 0.k. x x x x x x x x 
5 
Kaplan & ' 
Kemmer i c k  x x x 0.k. x x 0.k. 0.k. x o . k  2 
Landy & 
Aronson x x x x x x x x x x 
Mitchell  & . , 
Byrne (1973) X x x x x x x 0.k. x x 6 
Mitchel l  & 
Byrne (1972) x x x x x x x 0.k. x o .k 2 
-- -  
McComas & 
No11 x x 
Nemeth & 
Sosis  X X X X X 
9 
S i g a l l  & 
Ostrove x x 
St  . ephan . 
Sue e t .  a l .  x x x 0.k. x 0.k. 0.k. 2 X .  x o .k. 
1 TABLE 1 (continued) 
Vidmar .x X .  :, . x Y =  .x x X. o ..k. X. 7 0.. k . 8 
Colasanto 
& Sanders 0.k. o. k. 0.k. 0.k. 0.k. x 
1 1. The independent variable was a photograph of the defendant. 
2 .  The questionnaire allowed subjects to look ahead to the sentencing question while answering the guilt question. 
3. A video tape was used, but it presented a person reading a script. 
4. The experiment used the Sander case, heavily biased toward guilt. 
5. The subjects arrived at individual verdicts before group deliberation. 
6. The effect of the manipulation on guilt was not significant, and the case was skewed toward guilt. 
The. mean on guilt was approximately 6.00 on a 7 point scale. 
7. The script was the testimony of several witnesses. 
8. The manipulation is the crime the defendant is charged with. 
9. There were two separate students samples from two schools. 
10. The group deliberation was among three person groups, all of the same sex. 
x = threat to external validity is present 
0.k. = threat to external validity is absent 
TABLE 2: VERDICT BY INTENT, INSTRUCTION AND VICTIM FOR JURORS 
S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  General I n t e n t  
Ju ry  Law Judge Law Jury  Law Judge Caw 
S t a t e  Indiv.  S t a t e  Indiv.  S t a t e  Indiv.  S t a t e  Indiv.  
Gui l ty  
Piot Gui l ty  
x2 P 
I n t e n t  
I n s t r u c t i o n  
V i c t i m  
TABLE 3 :  SENTENCE (FINE)  BY INTENT AND VICIM FOR JURORS (N=279) 
S t a t e  I n d i v i d u a l  
None  
Under $ 2 0 0  
$ 2 0 0  
O v e r  '$500  
None  
Under $ 2  0  0 
$ 2 0 0  
$201-500  
O v e r  $500  
N= 
S p e c i f i c  c ~ e i e ~ & l  
TABLE 4 :  Means and 'vari&&s on Reasonable Defendant and 
Reasonable Person V a r i a b l e s  f o r  J u r o r s  
~ e a s o n a b l e ~  Reasonable 
b  
Defendant Person N 
S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  
G u i l t y  
General  I n t e n t  
G u i l t y  
General  I n t e n t  
Not G u i l t y  
Mean = 4.13 
Slagiance = 3.81 
S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  
Not G u i l t y  
A l l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between means a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  beyond t h e  .05 
l e v e l .  
2.62 
. 3  .-r7,1 
a. "The defendant  r e a l l y  thought  t h e  b r i c k s  were abandoned. " 
' (1 = very c e r t a i n  t h e  skatement i s  n o t  t r u e .  . . . 4  = un- 
c e r t a i n .  . . 7 = . v e r y  c e r t a i n  t h e  s t a t emen t  i s  t r u e )  
86 
b. "A r ea sonab le  person would have thought  t h a t  t h e  b r i c k s  were 
abandoned. " (same s c a l e  a s  above) 
TABLE 5: VERDICT BY INTENT, INSTRUCTION AND VICTIM FOR STUDENTS 
S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  Genera l  I n t e n t  
J u r y  Law Judge Law J u r y  Law Judge Law 
S t a t e  I n d i v .  S t a t e  -_ Ind iv .  S t a t e  I n d i v .  S t a t e .  I n d i v .  
Gui 1 t y  
-. 
n. : <-, 
. d \ i 2 >  ;,', 
Not .  G u i l t y  
,.' 2 P 
I n t e n t  . O O O ~  .9930 
I n s t r u c t i o n  .3685 .5438 
V i c t i m  1 .0444 ( .8331 1 
TABLE 6: Means and Var iances  on Reasonable Defendant  and 
Reasonable Person V a r i a b l e s  f o r  S t u d e n t s  
 ason on able^ Reasonable b  
Defendant -- person- . - - --- N 
I , 
S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  
G u i l t y  
General  I n t e n t  
Gui 1 t y  
Genera l  I n t e n t  
Not G u i l t y  
S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  
Not G u i l t y  
The on ly  cornpar is ions  which y i e l d  s i g n i f i c a n t  ( .05  l e v e l )  
d i f f e r e n c e s  are s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t - n o t  g u i l t y  v s .  s p e c i f i c  
i n t e n t - g u i l t y  and g e n e r a l  i n t e n t - n o t  g u i l t y  v s .  g e n e r a l  
i n t e n t - g u i l t y  . 
Mean = 4.68 
Var iance  = 2.48 
5.09 
2.54 
a. see n o t e  a f o r  Tab le  4 .  







3 3 ': 
<& 
G u i l t y  
Not G u i l t y  
TABLE 7: VERDICT BY INTENT, INSTRUCTION AND VICTIM FOR 
NON-DELIBERATING JURORS 
S p e c i f i c  I n t e n t  General  I n t e n t  
J u r y  Law Judge Law J u r y  Law Judge Law 
S t a t e  I n d i v .  S t a t e  ';-Indiv. S t a t e  I n d i v .  S t a t e  I n d i v .  
~ n s t r u c t i o n  .0807 
V i c t i m  .4018 
I n t e n t  .288 .5915 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Although w e  have n o t  been exhaus t ive ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h i s  l i s t  
inc ludes  most of t h e  important s t u d i e s  t h a t  had been published 
a s  of January,  1976. We have l i m i t e d  ourse lves  only t o  
art icles which e x p l i c i t l y  r e f e r  t o  j u r i e s ,  j u r o r s  o r  j u d i c i a l  
processes  i n  t h e i r  t i t l e ,  and have by impl ica t ion  o r  express  
s ta tement  conceived of t h e  r e sea rch  as r e l a t i n g  t o  jury deci-  
sion-making. W e  have, t h e r e f o r e ,  excluded many s t u d i e s  which 
have obvious impl ica t ions  f o r  ju ry  d e l i b e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  which 
have n o t  attempted t o  make t h e  analogy. Thus, f o r  ins t ance ,  
Wals te r ' s  w e l l  known piece  on assignment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  an acc iden t  i s  n o t  included because she  d i d  n o t  a t tempt  
t o  make any d i r e c t  comparisons t o  j u r i e s .  
I n  a d d i t i o n  w e  have genera l ly  r e s t r i c t e d  ourse lves  t o  pub- 
l i s h e d  s t u d i e s .  The only except ion is t h e  1972 Mitchel l  and 
r -.- - Byrne s tudy which is genera l ly  c i t e d  i n  t h e  published l i t e r a -  
l - 
t u r e .  For a more comprehensive examination of published and 
unpublished jury s t u d i e s  see Davis, e t  aA,,.l975. 
2. For t h e  purposes of t h e  p resen t  d i scuss ion  w e  have set a s i d e  
t h e  McComas & No11 and Vidmar s t u d i e s .  They concern a d i f f e r -  
e n t  i s sue ;  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of o f f e n s e  charged with v e r d i c t .  
I n  a r e c e n t  a r t i c l e  Lantz (1975:123.) has  cast s e r i o u s  doubt 
upon t h e  conclusions of t h e s e  s t u d i e s .  
3. See t h e  f u r t h e r  d i scuss ions  of j u d i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  below. 
4. Character  t r a i t s  of defendant on g u i l t  F=11.8 df=2,,,186. 
Evidence f a c t o r s  on g u i l t  F=299.1 df=1,;93. 
5. I n  Mitchel l  & Byrne (1973) on a seven po in t  s c a l e  from g u i l t y  
t o  no t  g u i l t y  t h e  mean score  f o r  a l l  s ub j ec t s  was approximately 
6. I n  t he  Stephan study t h e  s u b j e c t s  ranged between 36% and 
0% not  g u i l t y ,  depending upon t h e  t reatment .  The average 
appears t o  be around 10-12% wi th  t h e  remaining 88-908 f inding 
t h e  defendant g u i l t y  of some degree of homicide. 
6. See Sue, e t  -- a l ,  f o r  an example (1973:349). 
7. Moreover, even i n  these  cases  w e  should no t  f o rge t  t h a t  t h e r e  
\ 
r e a l l y  was l i t t l e  doubt a s  t o  g u i l t .  Thus i n  the  G r i f f i t t  
& Jackson p iece  defendant-subject a t t i t u d e  s i m i l a r i t y  d id  
c o r r e l a t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  with g u i l t ,  bu t  even t h e  s im i l a r  sub- 
j e c t s  tended t o  f i n d  t h e  defendant g u i l t y  (Mean = 2.66 on a 
7 po in t  s c a l e  where 1 equals  very c e r t a i n  g u i l t y  and 7 equals  
very c e r t a i n  no t  g u i l t y ) .  Gu i l t  a f t e r  a l l  is a dichotomous 
v a r i a b l e  i n  law--one is  o r  one i s  not .  It  may be t h a t  va r i -  
ab l e s  l i k e  defendant a t t i t u d e s  a f f e c t  t h e  c e r t a i n t y  of t h e  
v e r d i c t ,  bu t  may have less e f f e c t  on g u i l t  per  -- se. 
8. One o the r  s tudy,  by Stephan, d i d  a l low groups t o  decide a 
case. However, t h e  groups were of t h r e e  persons,  purpose- 
f u l l y  a l l  of t h e  same sex. This  does n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a 
d e l i b e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  l e g a l  sense. 
9. See Hamilton, 1974 and Gaskel l ,  1973. 
10;- The manipulations w e r e  embedded <n t h e  body of t h e  i n s t ruc t i ons .  
W e  at tempted t o  make them no more ob t rus ive  than they"wou1d 
be i n  a r e a l  t r i a l .  Thus, o u t  of about 7 minutes of ins t ruc -  
t i o n s ,  t h e  manipulations accounted f o r  only 30 t o  45 seconds. 
:*< 
These i n s t r u c t i o n s  are those  now given t o  f e d e r a l  j u r i e s  i n  
l i g h t  of Mor r i s se t t e .  
Although comparable d a t a  w a s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  populat ion 
of ju ro r s  i n  Washtenaw County, an examination of  t h e  d i s t r i -  
but ion  of our  sample of j u r o r s  on c e r t a i n  demographic va r i a -  
b l e s  seemed t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  our  sample w a s  n o t  s e r i o u s l y  
b iassed .  46.6 percent  of t h e  j u r o r s  w e r e  male and 53.4% 
female. Blacks w e r e  somewhat underrepresented (94.3% white ,  
5% black  and 0.7% another  r a c e ) .  A s  would be  a n t i c i p a t e d  i n  
a c i t y  such a s  Ann Arbor, p r o f e s s i o n a l s  and s t u d e n t s  w e r e  
overrepresented (31.8% p r o f e s s i o n a l  and t e c h n i c a l  workers 
and 12.4% s t u d e n t s ) ,  and t h e  educat ion and income d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n s  w e r e  more t o  t h e  high end of  t h e  s c a l e s  than  i s  t r u e  
f o r  t h e  populat ion i n  genera l  (median income was about $20,000 
and median educat ion was j u s t  over  3 years  of c o l l e g e ,  with 
almost one q u a r t e r  of t h e  sample having some graduate  t r a i n i n g .  
The mean age of t h e  sample w a s  39 years .  
Census d a t a  f o r  t h e  c i t y  of Ann Arbor i n  1970 shows t h e  
populat ion w a s  91% white  and t h e  median yea r s  of school ing 
was repor ted  t o  be 15.4. Also, t h e  l a r g e s t  propor t ion  of 
workers was i n  t h e  category of p ro fess iona l  and t e c h n i c a l  
workers. 
13. While e i g h t  s u b j e c t s  w e r e  always scheduled, w e  found it t o  be 
extremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  always g e t  a t  l e a s t  s i x  ju ro r s  t o  come. 
W e ,  t he re fo re ,  decided t o  run t h e  experiment wi th  f i v e  person 
j u r i e s  when necessary.  A comparison of f i v e  and s i x  person 
j u r i e s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e i r  v e r d i c t s .  
The primary d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t ,  as one might expect ,  5 person 
j u r i e s  w e r e  more l i k e l y  t o  reach a unanimous v e r d i c t  than were 
s i x  person j u r i e s  (82% vs.  4 9 % ) .  Other d i f f e r e n c e s ,  however, 
l ead  us  t o  conclude t h a t  t h e  use of t h e  smaller j u r i e s  does 
n o t  a f f e c t  our  f ind ings .  I n  a l l  cases  where t h e r e  a r e  d i f -  
fe rences ,  t h e  f i v e  person j u r i e s  a r e  opera t ing  a g a i n s t  our 
hypotheses. Moreover, t h e  main e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  experiment 
remain s i g n i f i c a n t  when w e  only look a t  s i x  person j u r i e s .  
Given t h e s e  r e s u l t s ,  w e  w i l l  t r e a t  a l l  j u r i e s  as a s i n g l e  
d a t a  set. 
I ' ,  
la:. , p T h e  p resen t  a n a l y s i s  uses t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  ju ro r  a s  t h e  u n i t  of 
a n a l y s i s .  Although w e  be l i eve  t h a t  t h e  jury i s  t h e .  u n i t  
which should be examined i n  any s tudy of jury decision-making, 
w e  have decided t o  use t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d a t a  f o r  comparabi l i ty  
with t h e  s t u d e n t  d a t a  presented below. I n  an e a r l i e r  paper,  
"The U s e  of Respons ib i l i ty  Rules i n  Jury Decision-Making: 
Mor isse t te  Revi's:i7ted'L, we cons ider  t h e  jury a s  a  whole. The 
r e s u l t s  a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  with r e s u l t s  
obtained using.j:uri"eiias t h e  u n i t  of a n a l y s i s .  
15. Each i n d i v i d u a l  i n  t h e  jury was asked t o  s ign  a  v e r d i c t  form 
a f t e r  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n .  For j u r i e s  t h a t  hung, two v e r d i c t  
forms w e r e  provided -- one f o r  those  vot ing  g u i l t y  and one f o r  
those  vo t ing  n o t  g u i l t y .  Subjec ts  who d i d  n o t  d e l i b e r a t e  
were asked t o  g ive  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  v e r d i c t  a t  t h e  s t a r t  of 
the post-experimental  in terv iew.  
1 6 .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between v ic t im and v e r d i c t  using j u r i e s  a s  
t h e  u n i t  of a n a l y s i s  i s - . n o t  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
1 7 .  For ju ro r s ,  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  reasonable defendant 
v a r i a b l e  and i n t e n t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  beyond t h e  .05 l e v e l  
(F = 6.27, df = 1,273) .  The i n t e r a c t i o n  of t h e  reasonable 
person v a r i a b l e  and i n t e n t  is  s i g n i f i c a n t  beyond t h e  . O 1  
l e v e l '  (:F =.  16.0,  df = 1,271.). 
\ _  ; 
18. However, we have some evidence t h a t  t h e  s tuden t s  consider  t h e  
" s i z e "  of v ic t im t o  be more important  than t h e  ju ro r s  do. I n  
t h e  p o s t - e x p e r i m h t a l  in terv iew we asked, "How important was 
it t o  you personal ly  t h a t  t h e  v ic t im i n  t h i s  case was a  
p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  r a t h e r  than a  l a r g e  organiza t ion  l i k e  t h e  
S t a t e  of Michigan i n  reaching your dec i s ion  a s  t b - H a r r i s '  
g u i l t  o r  innocence?" The ques t ion  was reversed f o r  those 
condi t ions  where t h e  v ic t im was t h e  Stiate of  Michigan. 
Subjec ts  responded i n  terms of a  f i v e  p o i n t  s c a l e .  Seventy-seven 
pe rcen t  of t h e  j u r o r s  and only 55% of t h e  s tuden t s  s t a t e d  t h a t  
t h e  " s i z e "  of t h e  v ic t im was n o t  important.  On t h e  o the r  hand, 
1 7 %  of t h e  j u r o r s  and 28% of t h e  s t u d e n t s  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  
p iece  of information was very importanId.)to them. These 
d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  .001 l e v e l .  
1 9 .  Nei ther  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  reasonable defendant 
v a r i a b l e  and i n t e n t  nor  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  reasonable 
person v a r i a b l e  and i n t e n t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  s tudents .  (F = 
.4285 and F = . 1 1 4 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  with 1990 degrees of freedom.) 
20. W e  ask,  "Do you r e c a l l  what t h e  judge s a i d  i n  h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
about t h e  i n t e n t i o n  t h e  defendant must have t o  be g u i l t y  of t h e  
crime?" and "Do you r e c a l l  what t h e  judge s a i d  i n  h i s  i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s  about t h e  duty of  ju ro r s  t o  obey and fol low h i s  i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s  a s  t o  t h e  law i n  t h i s  case?".  
21 .  See Mortimer R. Kadish and Sanford H.  Kadish, "The I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a -  
t i o n  of Conf l i c t :  Jury ~ c q u i t t a l s , "  Journal  of Soc ia l  I s sues  
27 ( 2 ,  1971) ,  f o r  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  d i scuss ion  of t h e s e  t h r e e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of t h e  ju ro r  r o l e .  
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